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Abstract 
 
 
This study explores the relationship between job satisfaction, employee loyalty and various 
types of flexible employment arrangements using the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 
(WERS) in 2004 and 2011. A propensity score matching and fixed effects regressions are 
applied. Finally, Bayesian Networks (BN) and Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) are employed 
in order to confirm the causality between employment types explored and the outcomes of 
interest. Furthermore, an instrumental variables (IV) approach based on BN framework is 
proposed and applied in this study. The results support that there is a positive causal effect from 
these employment arrangements on job satisfaction and employee loyalty.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Work especially the last years with the fast enhancement of technology and networks has 
been disconnected from a particular place and time and information technologies have made it 
possible for organizational workers to become untethered from their traditional office setting 
(Golden et al., 2006). While the traditional place of work used to be the employer’s premises, 
nowadays it is carried out in other locations, such as the employee’s home or while traveling. 
Advances in technology reshape the relationship between work and home, where in some cases 
the traditional flow of employees from home to office is reversed (Bailyn, 1988). The 
virtualization and this shock of the contemporary organisation has evolved as a vital necessity 
for the firms to be able to compete for workers globally and advances in information technology 
provide the means (WorldatWork, 2011). By 2016 it is estimated that around 90 million of self-
employed and employed U.S. workers will work from home or from a remote location at least 
2 to 3 days a week (Lister and Harnish, 2011). This study examines the relationship of 
teleworking or homebased working with job satisfaction and the employee loyalty in a sample 
of firms in Great Britain using the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) and two 
waves in 2004 and 2011. Then additional employment arrangements are explored, such as 
flexible time, implying that there is no fixed or set up time of starting and ending the job, the 
option of reducing or increasing the working hours and others and they will be compared with 
those of teleworking.  
Teleworking is a term used to describe an alternative work arrangement that enables 
employees to work from anywhere other than the traditional work setting or employer’s 
premises. Teleworking or telecommuting as it’s sometimes called has gained increasing 
popularity and acceptance throughout the United States and the world (Gajendran and Harrison, 
2007). According to the research study by Crandell and Gao (2005) telework has become an 
international phenomenon. Thus, teleworkers spend some portion of their time away from the 
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conventional workplace, working from home, and communicate by way of computer-based 
technology (Nilles, 1994). 
The concept of teleworking and flexible employment arrangements in general, are reflected 
in the principles of more and better jobs and better working conditions implemented by 
European Employment Strategy, Europe 2020 strategy and Guidelines for national employment 
policies. Employment Strategy was formally initiated at the Luxembourg European Council in 
1997, reflected almost exclusive focus on job creation, with very little emphasis on job quality 
issues. But as job creation took off in the late 1990s, the European consensus shifted towards 
to a more balanced view of employment growth. After the Lisbon Council in 2000, the 
European Employment Strategy placed the same emphasis on the quantitative and qualitative 
elements of job creation. In 2002, the Barcelona Council adopted “more and better jobs” as the 
motto for the European Employment Strategy (Eurofond, 2008). In European Union level there 
are no legislative acts issued on teleworking and other flexible working arrangements. 
Implementation of teleworking is regulated by the European Framework Agreement on 
Teleworking signed by European social partners on 16 July 2002 and although it is not 
incorporated into directive, it creates a contractual obligation for the affiliated organisations of 
the signatory parties. In the context of Article 139(2) of the EC Treaty, agreements between 
European Union level social partners are voluntary and autonomous and they are not foreseen 
to be implemented by Council decision.  
Previous studies have outlined the reasons for the growth of teleworking or other kinds of 
flexible type of employment, which are owned mainly to its perceived benefits. In particular, 
these benefits refer on both telework and employer including job satisfaction, increasing 
productivity, organizational loyalty, improved employee morale and employer retention and 
saving in space office among others (Bélanger, 1999; Potter, 2003). Secondly the relationship 
between teleworking and job satisfaction, as well as, the relationship between teleworking and 
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employee loyalty is examined. Since well-being and better quality of jobs are implemented and 
considered as the main objectives of the European Employment Strategy, job satisfaction and 
turnover intention or employee loyalty can be two alternative measures of examining the quality 
of job by the perspective of employees. This study adds to the previous literature by examining 
the above-mentioned linkages using panel data regressions, while the majority of the previous 
studies examined only one of the two above-mentioned relationships using mainly cross-
sectional data. Moreover, various types of employment arrangements are explored. Fixed 
effects models base on propensity score matching, accounting for intercept heterogeneity and 
selection and heterogeneous bias are estimated. In addition, a Bayesian Network framework 
and Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) representation are applied in order to examine and 
confirm the causal effect of flexible working employment arrangements on job satisfaction and 
employee’s loyalty on organisation. Moreover, in order to limit the endogeneity issue which 
might be coming from firm or employees’ relocation, only the firms who are located in the 
same area during the period examined are included into the sample as well as, the employees 
who have not changed travel to work area (TTWA). Regarding the job stayers, the panel 
structure of the data is such that only individuals who are employed in the same firm are 
followed. Nevertheless, the conclusions remain similar when the total sample is considered, 
since also the non-movers and job-stayers from the matched sample derived by the propensity 
score procedure constitute roughly the 85 per cent of the total sample, while the respective 
percentage for the unmatched sample is approximately 88 per cent. The findings support a 
positive effect from the employment arrangements examined on both job satisfaction and 
employee loyalty. This can have possible policy implications not only to employees and firms, 
but to society overall, which are discussed later.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the literature review on 
teleworking, job satisfaction and performance. Sections 3 presents the methodology, while in 
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section 4 the datasets are discussed. Section 5 considers the results and section 6 presents the 
concluding remarks and areas for future research.  
2. Literature Review 
 
In this section previous research studies on the association between teleworking and job 
satisfaction are briefly discussed. Organisation theorists have long recognized that any kind of 
interaction on the working environment can be an important determinant of job satisfaction.  
Sims et al. (1976) suggest that jobs, offering opportunities feedback, friendship and interacting 
with other people can improve employee’s job satisfaction.  Previous studies note that face-to-
face interaction is associated with positive outcomes (Olson et al., 2002).  Social interaction at 
work can facilitate social presence, foster mutuality and common ground and improve 
communication quality (Short et al., 1976; Burgoon et al., 2002). On the other hand, employees 
who face a small social presence at work and increased reliance on technology based job 
activities may experience lower levels of proper communication and less communication 
richness and quality (Lowry et al., 2006). Therefore, based on the previous researches 
teleworkers may report lower levels of job satisfaction owned to reduced frequency and quality 
of interaction with other people. Since this relationship is still unknown on a large scale study, 
this paper aims to examine the relationship between teleworking, job satisfaction and turnover 
intentions or employee loyalty.  
On the other hand, recent research studies confirm a positive relationship between 
teleworking and job satisfaction (Gajendran and Harrison, 2007), while other studies have 
found a curvilinear association, where increases of the teleworking hours increase the 
employee’s job satisfaction up to a point, after which the effects slightly fade out (Golden and 
Veiga, 2005). Thus, the traditionally belief that the face-to-face interactions at work have 
positive effects on job satisfaction may be overestimated and overgeneralised. Fonner and 
Roloff (2015) using a sample of 89 teleworkers and 103 office-based employees applied a path 
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analysis in order to test the adequacy of their mediation model and to examine the relationship 
between teleworking and job satisfaction. Additionally, they examined the indirect paths from 
telework to job satisfaction through work-life conflict, information stress exchange frequency 
and quality, stress from meetings and interruptions, general politics, and get ahead politics. 
Their results support that teleworking directly affects job satisfaction positively. 
This study adds to the previous research by examining the relationship between teleworking 
and job satisfaction and it is compared with other flexible working arrangements.  In this study 
this relationship, incorporated into a BN framework and DAG representation and using panel 
datasets, is explored. Moreover, various econometric techniques for robustness checks are 
followed, including fixed effects, two stage and three stage least squares.   
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
In this section a conceptual framework of the relationship between job satisfaction, 
employee loyalty and various types of working arrangements is presented.  Initially, the 
theoretical framework is presented in figure 1.  
In figure 1 it is assumed that telework affects the employee loyalty (EL) and job satisfaction 
(JS), while Z is a vector of individual, employee and firm and other job characteristics, which 
can affect, the employee loyalty and satisfaction, as well as, the decision and the propensity to 
choose this type of working arrangements, defined as the arrow headed from the characteristics 
Z to these arrangements. Finally, the arrows heading from job satisfaction to employee loyalty 
and vice versa indicate that a reverse causality might exist, as higher levels of job satisfaction 
can lead to higher levels of employee loyalty, while the vice versa can hold as well.  
On the other hand, it may be possible to find an effect from job satisfaction to flexible 
working arrangements, as for instance those who are less satisfied, they may decide to choose 
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these options in order to increase their job satisfaction. This effect may be much less plausible 
regarding the employee loyalty. In order to examine the causal effects of these flexible working 
arrangements on job satisfaction and employee loyalty a propensity score matching and a 
Bayesian Network framework is applied.  
(Insert Figure 1) 
3.2 Panel Regressions and Three Stage Least Squares 
The following job satisfaction function for individual i, in firm k, area-region j at time t. 
 
tkjijjtitkjitkjitkji Tll΄zWAaaJS ,,,,,,.,,,,, εθδµα κ ++++++++= 10                                                
(1) 
 
JSi,j,k,t denotes the job satisfaction and the vector WAi,j,k,t is a dummy indicating whether or 
not the respondent is involved in the current type of working arrangement or not in firm k, in 
region j and in time t. and z is a vector of individual and firm characteristics, including age, 
education level, marital status, whether there are dependent children 0-2 years old in the 
household or no dependent children, ethnicity, skills matching the job, the quality of relations 
between the managers and employees, whether the employees receive profit-related payments, 
whether the employees’ payment is linked to the outcome of the performance evaluation, 
whether there are formal job evaluation schemes in the workplace, whether there are more than 
one establishments of this workplace in the UK, trade union membership, total employment, 
the firm type, such as public, private, charity and local government among others, whether the 
workplace has a written policy on discrimination and equal opportunities, whether the 
respondent-employee supervise other employees, whether the place-location of the product or 
service of the workplace is local, regional, national or international, and whether this workplace 
faces competition from other over-seas companies. In addition, the market share could have 
been included, but it is highly correlated. Finally, the regression controls for standard travel tow 
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work areas (TTWA). Set μi denotes the individual-fixed effects, δκ is the firm fixed effect, lj is 
the area fixed effects, which is expressed by the TTWA, θt is a time-specific vector, while ljT 
is a set of the area-specific linear time trends which controls for unobservable, time-varying 
characteristics in the TTWA. Finally, εi,j,k,,t, express the error terms which it is assumed to be 
iid. Standard errors are clustered at the wave specific TTWA level and job satisfaction function 
(1) is estimated using WERS and the panel survey which was conducted in 2004 and 2011 and 
has information about employee, employer and firm characteristics.  
The working arrangements explored in this study are the following: flexi time which means 
that there is no fixed or specific start or end of the job, reducing working hours, implying that 
the employee has the option to transit from full-time to part-time, while increasing working 
hours imply the opposite, switching from part-time to full-time. The fourth employment type 
refers to employees who are home-based workers or teleworkers and work some days of the 
week at home. The next type is the option of changing shifts, while the last employment 
arrangements is compress hours, which is the option of working standard hours in less number 
of days, i.e. 35 hours in 4 days, instead of 5-6 days.  
 Then relation (1) is estimated by replacing the dependent variable with the ordered variable 
expressing the employee loyalty. In its current form, the model (1) cannot be estimated by 
ordered Probit or Logit using fixed effects. With cross-sectional data, it is very easy to use and 
to estimate by maximum likelihood these parametric models. However, in panel data no simple 
transformation -such as first-differencing or within-transformation- is available that would 
purge the ordered response models from the individual-specific fixed effects. Therefore there 
are two options, either estimating the model considering the dependent variable as continuous 
or converting the dependent ordinal variable in continuous variable assigning z-scores. This 
study follows the first approach, while the second method, proposed by van Praag and Ferrer-
i-Carbonell (2004) and the “Blow-Up and Cluster” (BUC) estimator developed by 
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Baetschmann et al. (2011) have been applied; however, the results are similar and are not 
presented here. In addition, the population of interest is limited to non-movers, which sample 
in this study is defined, as it has been mentioned, by the employees who have not relocated, 
based on TTWAs and the firms that have not moved to another location during the period 
examined. As it has been already mentioned, the WERS follows the same employees which are 
employed in the same firm-organisation. On the other hand, the movers sample assumes the 
opposite; employees and firms that have been relocated. Thus, the endogeneity issues refer to 
unobserved employee and firm characteristics. Similar to Manning (2003a, 2003b) the non-
movers, the job-stayers and the firms that do not relocate are considered in the sample. A similar 
approach has been followed by Mulalic et al. (2014), however they examine the wage 
differentials for commuting for workers belonging on the same firm and not teleworking. 
Concluding, the “sorting” issue can be associated to the choice of employees changing location 
which may affect their propensity to telework or to choose any other employment arrangement 
mode, as well as, to switch from one firm to another. In this case the fixed effects estimates will 
eliminate the firm-area (TTWA) fixed effects for non‐movers and the job –stayers, while for 
movers the error term will contain the difference in the area and firm fixed effects of the two 
locations and two employers-firms, which may be correlated with the propensity to choose a 
specific employment arrangement affecting job satisfaction and vice versa.  Next the following 
structural equation for job satisfaction and employee loyalty is estimated with 3SLS:  
tkjijjtitkjitkjitkjitkji Tll΄zELaWAaaJS ,,,,,,,,,2.,,10,,, εθδµα κ +++++++++=                                 
(2) 
tkjijjtitkjikjitkjitkji Tll΄zJSWAEL ,,,,,,,,,2.,,10,,, εθδµββββ κ +++++++++=                          
(3) 
 
 
3.3 Bayesian Networks and Instrumental Variables 
 
This section discusses the directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) and describes the Bayesian 
Network (BN) used in this study for causal inference. Even if this study is based on panel data 
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and fixed effects are considered, still a strong evidence of reverse causality remains. The 
graphical structure G= (V, E) of a BN is a directed acyclic graph DAG where V denotes the 
vertex or node set and E represents the edge set as Vi→ Vj The notation PiG is used to denote 
the parent set of Vi in G. pij is used to denote the j-th configuration of the parents of Vi: Pi ∈{pi1  
... , piqi}. Based on that the definition of BN is: 
Definition 1 (Bayesian network) (Pearl, 2000; Neapolitan, 2003): A Bayesian network model 
M over a set of variables V ={X1, ... ,XN} is a pair (Γ,θ), where G(V) is a DAG over V and θ is 
a set of conditional probabilities: θ = {θijk: ∀ (ijk)} such that (θijk = Xi = xik |Pi= pij). 
 
A BN is a graphical structural model that encodes probabilistic relationships among the 
variables of interest (Heckerman, 1997)1. A graph G(V,E) can be referred to as a directed acyclic 
graph (DAG), when the edges E linking nodes-set of variables V are directed and acyclic. 
Directed means that edges E represent direct causal effects, while acyclic means that the 
directed edges do not form circles.  (Spirtes et al., 2000; Pearl, 2000; 2009). Following 
Heckerman’s (1997) notation, a generic graph is presented in Figure 2. The arrow between T 
and F in figure 2 means that T may have a direct causal effect on F. Similarly, for the arrow 
between B and T or A and C or B and C. In the case where there are missing arrows, it is implied 
that the strong assumption of no direct causal effect between two variables is rejected, which is 
so-called “strong null” hypothesis of no effect. All variables directly or indirectly caused by a 
given variable are called its descendants. The descendants of T are F and Y, while the 
descendants of B are C, D, T (B’s children), E (D’s and T’s child), F (T’s child) and Y (child of 
A, C, D, E, F) and similarly for the remained nodes-variables. On the other hand, parents are 
the variables that direct cause another variable. In figure 2 the only parent of F is T, while the 
only parent of T is B. A similar definition to descendants, working on the opposite way, is the 
variables that directly and indirectly cause of another variable and are called ancestors. For 
                                                 
1
 Major advances have been made in inferring causal relationships from observational data (Pearl 1998, Spirtes et 
al. 2000). 
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example the ancestors of F are T and B, while the ancestors of E are B, D, and T. Paths are 
sequences of adjacent arrows that traverse any given variable at most once. The arrows along a 
path may point in any direction. For example if B is the treatment and F is the outcome then 
B→T→F is the only causal path. 
(Insert Figure 2) 
The DAG defines a factorization of the joint probability distribution of V = {X1, ... ,XN }, 
often called the global probability distribution, into a set of local probability distributions, one 
for each variable. The form of the factorization is given by the Markov property of Bayesian 
networks which states that every random variable Xi directly depends only on its parents: 
∏
=
=
m
i
ii parxpxp
1
)|()(                                                                                                                    (4) 
Applying the chain rule of probability, we have: 
∏
=
−=
m
i
ii xxxpxp
1
11 ),....,|()(                                                                                                             (5) 
The causal Markov assumption is that each node is independent of its non-descendants in 
the graph conditional on its parents in the graph.  
Definition 2 (One-step ahead conditional independence non-causality).  X does not strongly 
cause Y one-step ahead given a set of covariates Z and Y does not cause X given a set of 
covariates K if (6)-(7) hold.  
 
tititi ZXY ,1,, |−⊥                                                                                                                            (6) 
tititi KYX ,1,, |−⊥                                                                                                                           (7) 
 Yi,t ⊆ Zi,t ⊆ Ωi,t and Xi,t ⊆ Ki,t ⊆ Ωi,t. and Ω is the set of all covariates included in sets K and Z, 
for individual i and time t.  The symbol ⊥ is used to express independence.  
Definition 3 (Conditional independence non-causality).  The conditional independence X is 
conditional independent from Y in the edge set E iff Yi,t ⊥  Xi,t | Ωi,t  
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The independence assumptions discussed above and are represented by the graph imply that 
parameters need to be estimated because the probability distribution for each variable depends 
only on the node’s parents as it is shown in relations (4)-(5). Using the factorisation equation 
(5) it allows the network factorisation in such a way that it considers each node and its parents 
in isolation from the rest of the model variables. Otherwise, without employing this 
factorisation, far more parameters would be required to be estimated and therefore to specify 
the causal-effect relationships by a fully connected network and “unfactorable” model. Thus, 
employing factorisation model (5) the very complex models can be estimated avoiding the 
combinatorial explosion problem. In Figure 2 the Markov condition for F to B entails the 
following conditional independence relation:  
TBF |⊥                                                                                                                                    (8) 
 
More specifically, (8) implies that nodes F and B are independent as there is no direct edge 
connecting them and given T. A similar interpretation can be derived for the remained nodes. 
Next one very important definition for the DAG and BN, which is the d-separation is discussed.  
Definition 4. (d-separation) (Pearl, 1988; Spirtes et al., 2000; Neapolitan, 2003):  Let G= (V,E) 
be a DAG, A ⊆ V, X and Y be distinct nodes in VA, and h be a chain between X and Y. Then 
h is blocked if one of the following cases holds: 
 There is a node S∈A on the chain h and the edges incident to S on h meet head-to-tail at S. 
There is a node S∈A on the chain h and the edges incident to S on h meet tail-to-tail at S.  
There is a node S such that S and all of S’s descendants are not in A on the chain h and the edges 
incident to A on h met head-to-head at S. 
 
The d-separation condition is especially important and useful in constructing a BN because 
it controls for possible confounds as in the form of S described here. In other words, a set of 
variables S d-separate variable X from Y, if and only if S blocks every path from X to Y. 
Graphically,  d-separation usually exhibits two main cases: firstly X→S→Y and secondly 
X←S→Y. The intuition behind this graphical representation is that X and Y are independent 
from each other conditioned on S. In the first case X causes Y through S, while in the second 
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case X and Y have a common cause S. To ascertain whether a particular conditional 
independence statement X⊥Y|S is implied the possible paths from any node in X to any node in 
Y are considered. Any such path is blocked if it includes a node such that either the arrows on 
the path meet either head-to-tail or tail-to-tail at the node, and the node is in S, such as the 
relations X→S→Y and X←S→Y or the arrows meet head-to-head at the node, and neither the 
node, nor any of its descendants, is in S. If all paths are blocked, X is d-separated from Y given 
S, and the joint distribution over all of the variables in the graph will then satisfy X⊥Y |S.  
Lemma 1: Suppose Γ is a Bayesian network, and Y is a leaf node, where a leaf node is defined 
as the node that has no children. Let Γ΄ be the Bayesian network obtained from Γ by removing 
Y. Let Ω be the set of all nodes in Γ. Then it will be: 
 
)()( ' ΩΩ ΓΓ = PP                                                                                                                         (9) 
Proof: 
)())(|())(|())(|(
))(|())](|([),()(
' Ω
ΩΩ
Γ
Ω∈Ω∈
Ω∈
ΓΓ
∑ ∏∏
∑ ∏∑
==
===
PWparWPYparYPWparWP
YparYPWparWPYPP
Y WW
Y WY
                                                                                                                   
The third equality holds because is a leaf node; thus Y is not in X and cannot be in any par(W) 
for any W ∈Ω.  Also the fourth equality holds because probability sums to one.  
Proposition 1.  Let X be a set of nodes in a Bayesian network Γ and suppose X is ancestral. Let 
Γ΄ be the Bayesian network obtained from Γ΄ by removing all nodes outside X. Then 
 
)()( ' ΧΧ ΓΓ = PP                                                                                                                       (10) 
Proof: 
First step is to find a leaf node and then remove it. Next we get  Γ΄. According to Lemma 1 the 
probability distribution of X remains unchanged throughout the procedure. 
 
Proposition 2.  Let X, Y, and S be three disjoint sets of nodes in a Bayesian network such that 
their union is the set of all nodes. If S d-separates X and Y as above then X⊥Y |S. 
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Proof: 
Let S1 be the set of nodes in S that have parent in X and let assume that S2=S\S1. The latter 
shows that S2 is member of S, but not member of S1 defined by \. Because S d-separates X and 
Y then:  
For any W∈X∪ S1, par(W)⊆X∪ S   and 
For any W∈Y∪ S2, par(W)⊆Y∪ S    
Then let us consider:  
]))(|(][))(|([))(|()( ∏∏∏
∪∈∪∈∪∪∈
==
YSSXYSX 21
YS,X,
WWW
WparWPWparWPWparWPP                                                                                                                    
And 
]))(|(∏
∪∈ 1SXW
WparWP  is a function of X and S, while ∏
∪∈ 2SYW
WparWP ))(|(  is a function of Y 
and S. 
Theorem 1. (Global Markov property) (Pearl, 2000; Neapolitan, 2003):  Given a Bayesian 
network, let X and Y be two variables and S be a set of variables that does not contain X or Y. If 
S d-separates X and Y, then 
 
S|YX ⊥                                                                                                                                        (11)     
Proof:  
Based on the proposition 1 it can be assumed that an({X,Y}∪S) equals the set of nodes. Thus, 
X⊥Y|S in original network iff it is true in the restriction onto the ancestral set and S d-separates 
X and Y in original network iff it is true in the restriction onto the ancestral set. Next let X be 
the set of all nodes that are NOT d-separated from X by S and let Y be the set of all nodes that 
are neither in X or Z. Because of proposition 2 it is X⊥Y |S  
There must exist functions f (X,S) and g(S,Y), such that P(X,S,Y)= f (X,S)g(S,Y). Also it should 
be noticed that X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y. 
Then let be X΄= X \ {Χ} and be Y΄= Y \ {Y}. Then we have P(X, X΄, S, Y, Y) = f (X, X,S)g(S, 
Y, Y). 
Consequently it will be: 
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And that is (11) or X⊥Y|S 
Definition 5. (Partial Correlation): For i ≠ j ∈ 1, . . . , p, k ∈ Xr, let ρi,j|k be the partial correlation 
between Xi and Xj given Xr and Xr denotes the rest of the variables.  
 
Based on this definition we have that Xi ⊥⊥ Xj| Xr ⇔ ρi,j|k. Next the Fisher’s Z test for the 
conditional independence is presented (Spirtes et al., 2000; Kalisch and Buhlmann, 2007): 
0=CXY|ρ                                                                                                                                  (12) 
|)(|
|)(|
log||)(
|
|
| ,
CXY
CXY
CXY
Cnz n
ρ
ρ
ρ
−
+
−−=
1
1
3
2
1
                                                                                                       (13) 
|C| is the number of variables in C and n is the length of the sample. If X,Y,C~N under the null 
hypothesis of zero partial correlation: 
),(~)( ,|
^
10Nz nCXYρ                                                                                                                   (14) 
The test for independence is based on the PC algorithm (Spirtes et al., 2000) at significance 
level α. Kalisch and Buhlmann (2007) show that the choice of α is not too important. However, 
a significance level α=0.01 is used. The pseudo-code of the PC algorithm is presented in figure 
3. The PC algorithm takes as input raw data and the degree of a vertex is the number of vertices 
adjacent to it. In the large sample limit in the worst case the number of conditional independence 
tests required by the algorithm is bounded above by nk+2 where k is the maximum degree of any 
vertex in the true DAG. More specifically, the PC algorithm consists from four steps.  
In the first step the PC algorithm estimates the skeleton of the DAG starting by a complete 
undirected graph, where every node is connected to each other. For instance the edge between 
two variables X and Y is tested whether there is a conditioning set S such that X and Y are 
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independent given S, which is denoted as previously X ⊥ Y|S. In the case that such a set, called 
as separation set, is found then the edge between X and Y is deleted. This indicates that there is 
not any direct causal relationship between them and thus, there will be no edge between them 
in the true causal structure. 
In the second step the information on separation sets is used to orient unshielded colliders. 
As an example the following theoretical skeleton XZY is considered, where X and Y are 
not connected. In that case, the true causal structure might be one of the following: X→Z→Y, 
X←Z←Y, X→Z←Y and X←Z→Y. By applying d-separation, it becomes X→Z→Y, X←Z←Y 
and X←Z→Y implying that X is dependent on Y given Z and thus, if Z is not in the separation 
set of X and Y, the only causal structure is X→Z←Y, which is an unshielded collider. This 
example is generalised to the rule that in the case that Z is not in the separation set of X and Y 
in an unshielded triple XZY then the unshielded triple must be directed into an unshielded 
collider. 
In the last step all the edges that are still undirected are checked such a way that two possible 
directions would lead to a new unshielded collider or a cycle. In the case that this will happen 
the undirected edge is directed into the other direction to rule out a new unshielded collider 
which were already found in step 2 or a cycle (for more details on PC algorithm see also Spirtes 
et al., 2000).  
Overall, various approaches deriving causality have been developed. The first approach is 
the propensity score method, originally proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), which has 
been developed in order to assess the causal effects of interventions. This approach however, 
allows only for one treatment and one effect. In the case examined here this is applicable to 
examine only one effect, while with BN the exploration of multiple treatment effects is possible,  
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Thus, the main purpose is to examine the causal effects, not only of the various employment 
arrangements job satisfaction and employee loyalty,  but also the causal effects between the last 
two main outcomes of interest.  
To summarise and briefly explain in plain word the BN implemented by relation (5) and the 
back-door and front-door criteria accounting for over control bias, in addition to X and Y, there 
will generally be some covariates Z which we know, and it is assumed that the DAG is known. 
The first condition is the back-door condition, where it is possible to condition on a chosen set 
of Z covariates which block all the indirect paths from X to Y, but leave the direct paths open 
and there should not be a variable or a set of variables blocking the path from X to Y. This can 
be done with regression analysis, but it should be done right and carefully. The second criterion 
is the front-door criterion, where a set of variables S which mediate the causal effect from X to 
Y and all the effects pass from X to Y through S.  If the effect of M on Y can be identified, and 
of X on M then these effects can be combined to get the effect of X on Y. Finally, the last 
identification method, is the instrumental variables approach where a variable W which affect 
X and which only affects Y by influencing X.  
Regarding the back-door criterion, when estimating the effect of X on Y a back-door path is 
an undirected path between X and Y with an arrow into X and these paths create confounding, 
by providing an indirect non causal channel along which information can flow. Thus, a set of 
conditioning variables or controls Z satisfies the backdoor-criterion when Z blocks every back-
door between X and Y and also no node in Z is a descendant of X or both descendent of X and 
ancestor of Y because it will block the causal path between X and Y.  Thus, if set Z satisfies the 
back-door criterion then it will be:  
∑ =====
z
zZzZxXYxXdoY )Pr(),|Pr())(|Pr(                                                                       (15) 
All the items on the right hand of (15) are observational conditional probabilities and not 
counterfactuals. The condition that Z blocks every back-door between X and Y is met. However, 
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regarding the second condition, it is not desirable to include descendants of X which are also 
ancestors of Y because this will block off some or all of the causal paths from X to Y. Thus, this 
shows that Y⊥Pa(X)|X,Z, which in other words it tells us that Y is independent from the parents 
of X given X and Z. Nevertheless, in this study we explore whether the back-door criterion or 
an instrumental variable from BN is more appropriate based on the data and the causal 
relationships that will be derived by the BN and presented as DAG. 
Next a DAG representation where an instrumental variable I can meet the conditions and 
be used into the analysis is presented in figure 4, where the instrumental variable I is related to 
the cause of interest X and influences Y only through its impact on X and at least one control 
variable blocks the other path, such the variable-node S, which can be also a set of variables S.  
In the case of figure 4 in order to use variable I as an instrument, we should condition on S but 
not on W because it is descendant of Y and the common cause of W coming from I and Y will 
lead to selection bias as it has been described in the methodology part and the d-separation 
condition. More specifically, a variable I qualifies as an IV for X (factor of interest) and Y 
(outcome of interest if the following three conditions are met: a) I is statistically independent 
of all joint common causes of X and Y; b) I is not independent of X; and c) the effect of Z on Y 
is mediated solely by X.  
 
Lemma 2. Given a path diagram G and which contains the direct edge X→Y, then a variable 
W can be an instrumental variable for X given Z, which is a set of variables that does not 
contain any variable from W, X,Y, or Desc(Y) if the following conditions are met:    
- In the path diagram G, X and W are connected given Z 
- In the path diagram G\X→Y which is formed by removing X→Y from G, W and Y are d-
separated given Z.  
 
Then the direct causal effect τyx is given by: 
 
zwx
zwy
yx
⋅
⋅
=
σ
σ
τ                                                                                                                    (16) 
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Lemma 2 can be extended into a set of instrumental variables Wi for i=1,….,k. In that case 
the direct causal effects 
kyxyx
ττ ,.......,
1
can be solved by a system of k equations as:  
jjii yx
k
j
zxwzyw τσσ ∑
=
⋅⋅ =
1
    , for  i=1,…k                                                                         (17) 
 
For instance when X⊥Y then it is cov(X,Y)=0. In relation (13), σwy.z is the conditional 
covariance between W and Y given Z=z, while similarly σwx.z is defined as the conditional 
covariance between W and X given Z=z. Considering the Cov(W,Y,|Z) =E[W,Y |Z] − 
E[W|Z]E[Y |Z]. This will be  E[(W,Y − E[W|Z]Y − WE[Y |Z] + E[W|Z]E[W |Z])|Z] = E[W,Y 
|Z] − E[W|Z]E[Y |Z] − E[W|Z][Y |Z] + E[W|Z]E[Y |Z] = E[W,Y |Z] − E[W|Z]E[Y |Z. In a 
similar fashion the Cov(W,X|Z) will be E[W,X |Z] − E[W|Z]E[X |Z].  
Thus, this test can be applied in other studies using IV approach and to define whether the 
IV is proper or not, especially regarding the selection bias.  
 
 
4 Data 
 
 
The Workplace Employment Relations Study (WERS) series commenced in 1980 and took 
place six times until 2011. The 2004 and 2011 Panel Survey was conducted in a random sub-
sample of workplaces and the surveys are conducted to managers and employees. This is useful 
for the analysis, since the regression control not only for employee characteristics, but also for 
firm characteristics, such as competition, market area, status of the institution. 
The first outcome of interest is the job satisfaction, which is an ordered variable measured 
in a Likert scale from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). Similarly, employee loyalty is 
an ordered variable answering to the question “To what extent do you agree or disagree with 
the statement that you are loyal to your firm-organisation” measured in a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). In table 1 the summary statistics for the outcomes of interest-
job satisfaction and employee retention- and the factors of interest which are the employment 
arrangements explored in this study are presented. The average job satisfaction and employee 
loyalty levels are relatively high to our sample with average very close to 4. Regarding the 
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employment arrangements explored in this study, the lowest percentage of participation belongs 
to teleworking followed by compressing hours mode by 16 and 20.5 per cent respectively.  
More specifically, teleworking in our sample refers to people who mainly work at home. 
Reducing hours it means the option that the employee can switch from full-time employment 
or part-time, while increasing working hours implies the opposite. Change shifts as the name 
declares, it obviously indicates the case where employees can change working shifts, while 
compressing hours employment mode is the option where the employee can be occupied the 
same working hours per week distributed in a smaller number of days. For instance working 35 
hours per week in 4 days instead of 5 or 6 days.  Additional, variables are not presented, as the 
descriptive statistics do not give any additional insights, for this reason a correlation matrix 
among the outcomes of interest and the employment arrangements is presented in table 2. In all 
cases there is a positive relationship among the various types of employment, as well as, a 
positive association between employee loyalty, job satisfaction and employment types. 
Additional factors are not explored as they are used as controls in to the regressions; however, 
some correlation statistics show for instance that wage and higher education degree are positive 
associated with flexi time and teleworking and negatively related to changing shifts.   
 
(Insert tables 1-2) 
5 Empirical Results 
 
In table 3 the fixed effects estimates for job satisfaction and the various working 
arrangements before the propensity score matching takes place, are reported. In this case only 
the coefficients of these arrangements are presented, while the full estimates for the control 
variables are presented later in this section after the matching is conducted. In all cases there is 
a positive relation between the implementation of these employment arrangements and the 
levels of job satisfaction. The higher association is presented in the mode of flexible time 
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followed by change shifts and teleworking. In column (7) the results including all the 
employment modes are presented. However, as it can been seen the options of either reducing 
or increasing the working hours are insignificant, while also the magnitude of the remained 
coefficients is reduced. Since, these employment types may be highly correlated and it could 
be difficult to disentangle their effects, separate regressions for each type of working mode are 
taking place.  
In table 4 the conditional. Logit estimates for the various employment arrangements are 
presented, where the dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 whether there is the choice 
of the employment type examined and 0 if there is not. There is a monotonic decrease on age 
of the propensity to implementation of these employment types, where those aged older than 
17 years old and up to 64 years old are less likely to choose one of these employment types.  
Regarding teleworking there is no difference on age. Married or couples seems to not be a 
significant factor, while those who are divorced and widowed are less likely to choose the mode 
of “compress hours”, while the last group is more likely to choose teleworking, as well as, the 
probability occurrence of switching from part-time to full-time is reduced. Education level has 
overall mixed results and in many cases the coefficients are insignificant. Nevertheless, the 
exception is teleworking, where the more educated people have more chance to choose this 
employment type. This may be related to the fact that higher educated people are more likely 
to be managers or supervisors and to assign workload to other people, while they can spend 
more time at home. Also, teleworking can be related with information technology usage, where 
more educated people usually have these skills. This is also confirmed by the coefficient of the 
variable on whether the respondent supervises or manages other people. In the case where they 
do not supervise are less likely to be employed at home or to telework, while are more likely to 
reduce the working hours. The results additionally show that there is heterogeneity regarding 
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the ethnicity, such as other white, Indians, Pakistanis, other Asians, Africans and those from 
Caribbean are more likely to choose the various types of employment examined.  
Regarding the weekly hours worked per week a negative relationship between these and 
reducing hours, teleworking and changing shifts is observed, while a positive relationship 
between weekly hours and compress hours is observed. The remained coefficients are 
insignificant. However, this does not necessarily implies less hours of work per week, since for 
example those who switch from full-time to part-time it is obviously expected a reduction of 
weekly hours and thus leading to a negative relationship. The weekly wage presents also mixed 
results, while in lower wage levels it is more likely that the respondents will choose the 
transition from full-time to part time and vice versa, as well as, changing shifts, while in higher 
levels of wage are less likely to implement these types of employment. It should be noticed that 
there additional scales of wages; however, are not reported here as the concluding remarks 
remain similar. The same applies for the table 5, where the fixed estimates of the job satisfaction 
function are presented. The remained employment arrangements are insignificant, while 
teleworking is significant in higher wage levels. However, this may imply that those who are 
teleworkers may earn more, based on their skills and computing information technology 
knowledge and the job position. It should be noticed that also whether the respondents use 
computer in their job or not has been also examined. The results showed that those who use 
mainly computer in their work are more likely to implement flexi time and teleworking 
employment types, while the relationship with the remained employment modes is 
insignificant.  
Finally, regarding the product-service coverage area of the firm-organisation regional, 
national and international firms are less likely to implement those types of employment modes 
than the local ones are. On the other hand, teleworking is more plausible to be implemented in 
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the regional and national firms, while there is no difference between local and international 
organizations.  
(Insert tables 3-4) 
 
The fixed effects estimates after the propensity score matching are presented in table 5. 
The results show that the relationship between job satisfaction and the employment 
arrangements explored is positive and significant. The highest magnitudes are presented in the 
case of the teleworkers, followed by those who choose the option of changing shifts and those 
who implement flexi time. The remained coefficients show that elder workers are more satisfied 
with their job, while the married or couples and divorced are more likely to report higher levels 
of job satisfaction than the singles. Regarding education and the level of skills to job matching, 
those with first degree in some cases report lower levels of job satisfaction, which is consistent 
with other studies, arguing that more educated people have higher expectations about their 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns form their job and thus are more easily disappointed and 
dissatisfied (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Hamermesh, 2000). The same applies with the matching 
skills to job. More precisely, those who stated that their skills match the job almost the same or 
bit lower report higher levels of job satisfaction than those who stated that are over-qualified.  
The ethnicity group is significant and more specifically, those who belong to the other 
white, Caribbean and African groups are less likely to report higher job satisfaction levels than 
British. The competition, the profit-related payments, the status of company, whether public or 
private, the weekly number of working hours and the proportion of non-managerial undergone 
performance appraisal are insignificant factors. On the other hand, performance related 
payments schemes and supervising other employees increase the job satisfaction levels, as well 
as those who state that the quality of relations between employees and managers is either good 
or very good, relatively to those who reported low levels of manager-employee relations. Wage 
presents mixed results among the employment arrangements examined. More specifically, the 
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wage is significant in all scales regarding flexi time and either increasing or decreasing working 
hours, while for the remained employment types, the wage is significant only in the lower and 
highest scales.  
 
(Insert table 5) 
 
In table 6 the propensity score matching test is presented. More specifically, the test 
examines the null hypothesis whether the matched samples-treated and untreated- share similar 
characteristics. In this case the propensity score matching passes the test for all the variables 
examined, with the exception of the formal written policies for equal opportunities, where the 
null hypothesis is rejected at 10 per cent significance level. The same conclusions are derived 
for the job satisfaction index and the employee loyalty; therefore are not presented.  
Next a job satisfaction index based on six indices is constructed. It is argued that this index 
can be more complete and precise, as well as, it can be used as robustness checks to the main 
overall job satisfaction variable. Principal component analysis is applied, while a factor analysis 
can be applied as well. The six job satisfaction indices answer to the following question, and 
the scale is the same with the job satisfaction and it has been described in the data section, 
ranging between 1 and 5.  Satisfaction about using your own initiative, Satisfaction about the 
amount of influence, Satisfaction about the training you receive, Satisfaction about the payment 
amount, Satisfaction about the job security, Satisfaction about the development of job skill.  
In table 7 and panel A the results when the dependent variable is the job satisfaction factor 
index, which has been derived with principal component analysis are presented. In this case 
again all the employment arrangements are significant, with higher magnitudes on teleworking 
followed by flexi time and changing shifts. In addition, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
took place in order to test the new job satisfaction index and the tests show a good fit. More 
specifically, aaccording to the comparative fit index (CFI) developed by Bentler (1990) and the 
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Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) proposed by Tucker and Lewis (1973), values higher than 0.8 
indicate a good fit of the data. In the case examined CFI and TLI were found equal at 0.958 and 
0.920 respectively. In addition, if the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is 
lower than 0.5 as a rule of thumb the CFA analysis implies a very good fit of the data. In our 
case RMSEA is 0.0024.  
Finally, in panel B of table 7 the fixed effects estimates for the employee loyalty are reported 
showing again that teleworkers and home-based workers are more likely to be loyal to their 
firm-organization presenting the highest coefficient magnitude, followed by those who 
implement flexi time and changing shifts. However, the coefficient of reducing hours or 
switching from full-time to part-time is insignificant. The remained coefficients are not 
reported, as the concluding remarks derived are similar with those found in the job satisfaction 
regressions, as well as, these factors are not the main interest of this study.  
In table 8 the job satisfaction estimates for the total and mover sample, after the propensity 
score matching are reported. To remind the reader, in this case the movers sample is defined as 
the firms that have relocated, as well as, the employees who have changed location. Since the 
panel is based on employee and firm, the data structure also follows the same employees in the 
same firms. In panel A the estimates for the total sample are very similar with those found in 
the table 5 considering the non-movers sample. It is observed that changing shifts presents the 
higher coefficient magnitude flowed by flexi time and teleworking. In panel B the estimates for 
the movers sample and job satisfaction are reported.  All the coefficients are insignificant, with 
the exception of teleworking and changing shifts, where the effects of teleworking are very 
close with those found using the total and non-movers sample. On the other hand, the 
employment type of changing shifts presents lower effects on job satisfaction. Thus, this may 
indicate that limiting the sample to non-,movers may not lead to biased estimates regarding 
teleworking, since it may not be affected by the firm relocation or whether the employee moved 
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to another location, expressed by the TTWA. Similar conclusions are derived for the employee 
loyalty; however are not presented.  
(Insert tables 6-8) 
The 3SLS for the system of equations (2)-(3) and job satisfaction, employee loyalty and 
employment arrangements relationships are reported in table 9. It becomes obvious that job 
satisfaction causes employee loyalty and vice versa, where a higher level of job satisfaction is 
associated with a higher level of employee loyalty and the opposite as well. In all cases the 
employment types are positive and significantly associated with job satisfaction, while in the 
case of the employee loyalty, reducing hours and changing shifts are not significant. Moreover, 
based on the Hansen-Sargan statistic the null hypothesis that the variables are exogenous is 
rejected. For this reason in the next part of this section the BN framework is applied.   
(Insert table 9) 
In figure 5 the estimated DAG for teleworking is presented while the BN estimates 
considering all the employment arrangements explored in the study, are reported in table 10. A 
similar representation is observed for the remained of the employment types, but their 
associated DAGs are not presented here. Also separate estimates for each employment 
arrangements is taking place since it is difficult to disentangle their effects, when they are 
included into the same regression. Including all the working types into the same DAG, the 
estimates confirm the results of table 3 and column (7), where some of these types become 
insignificant. The reason is that regression presents over-control bias where some variables 
block the causal effect from the variable of interest to the outcome. For instance coming back 
to figure 2, F blocks off the causal effect from T to Y since there is no direct effect (arrow) from 
the former to the latter. Similarly, in this case teleworking may block –off the causal effect from 
increasing hours or changing shifts to job satisfaction. Thus, one solution is to not include them 
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in to the same DAG, while the second solution is to incorporate them into the same DAG and 
BN and applying the back-door and front-door criteria wherever necessarily.  
 Before we proceed to the findings conclusion, the abbreviations of the variables in the DAG 
figure 5 are described. Variables ethnic, mastat, superv_other, num_hours and age indicate 
respectively ethnicity, marital status, supervising other employees, number of weekly hours 
worked and age. The other variables have as following: dependent children 0-2 years old 
(dep_chil_0_2), years worked (years_exp), education level (education), status of company 
(status_com), number of firm establishments (single_ind), whether the skills match to 
employee’s work (skill_job), area market of the firm (market_ope), TTWA (area), quality of 
relations between managers and employees (rel_mang_emp), wage (wage), percentage of 
employees in the firm using computer (computer_use), whether the employee is member of 
union trade or staff association (union_memb), formal written policies for equal opportunities 
in the institution (policy_dis), performance pay schemes (perf_pay), related profit schemes 
(related_prof), proportion of non-managerial staff under performance evaluation 
(prop_non_man_eval) home-teleworkers (home_tele_work), job satisfaction (job_sat) 
employee loyalty (loyal).  
Applying the factorization model (5) and the back-door and front-door criteria and the d-
separation the causal effect of the teleworking on job satisfaction is a regression of itself and 
its parents-computer_use, wage, education, union_memb, rel_mang_emp, skill_job and 
superv_other. The causal effect of teleworking is very similar to those found in table 5. Similar 
DAGs are estimated for the remained employment arrangements; however are not presented 
here, but their causal effects are reported in table, which are very close to those found in table 
5. It should be noticed that the estimates differ from panel A of table 8, since in the last table 
the job satisfaction factor index is taken, while in tables 5 and 10 the overall job satisfaction is 
considered.  
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Various other conclusions can be derived from DAG in figure 5. For instance the regression 
should not condition on employee loyalty since it is caused by both job satisfaction and 
teleworking, leading to selection bias. Similarly, if we would like to derive the causal effect of 
wage on job satisfaction, a regression including the wage and its parents will take place. 
Another example is computer use, where its causal effect is blocked-off by teleworking. In this 
case also the regression should include the computer use and its parents, in order to estimate 
the causal effect of computer percentage use on job satisfaction. However, two things are 
concluded. Firstly, conditioning on teleworking, the causal effect of computer use is blocked-
off from teleworking leading to over-control bias, as it has been discussed in the methodology 
section and since there is no direct effect-arrow to job satisfaction. Thus, in this case the front-
door and back-door criteria are applied. Secondly, coming back to the figure 4 computer use 
can be used as an instrumental variable because is directly related to teleworking, and is 
conditioned on related_prof which the latter affects the job satisfaction. Thus, the IV should be 
conditioned on at least one other variable which causes job satisfaction. In this case the causal 
effect of teleworking on job satisfaction using the percentage of employees using computer in 
the institution-firm is 0.1251 (sd. error 0.0329), the weak instrument test is 84.868 rejecting the 
hypothesis that the instrument is weak, while the endogeneity Sargan statistic is 8.958 (p-value 
0.2315). Thus, BN can be a very useful tool or empirical research allowing us to find proper 
instrumental variable wherever possible. However, the results confirm that IVs are not always 
necessarily into BN framework for causality. A similar application for the remained 
employment types can be considered.  
Overall, the study shows that employees are likely to assess elements of job satisfaction 
related with their personal characteristics and beliefs, such as their skill matching, wages and 
age and with firm characteristics. More specifically, one type of firm characteristics is the 
rewarding system, such as whether there are performance to pay or profit related payments. The 
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second type refers to traditional economic characteristics, like area market, competition, 
company status and others. The last type which is of main importance to the job satisfaction 
and employee loyalty, is the culture of the company, represented by the quality of relations 
between managers and employees.      
(Insert table 10) 
Since the job satisfaction and employee retention have a central role to firm’s organization 
and policy, but also are topics of the policy makers’ agenda for the improvement of the society’s 
well-being, Bayesian networks can have important policy implications, as causal inference has 
a central role in well-being and policy making. These implications can be extended and applied 
in many other domains of well-being and public policy, including life satisfaction, leisure and 
public health and policy generally, such as public goods and “bads” including air, noise and 
water pollution among others. Since the natural experiments are very difficult to be found and 
many times may not be under the researcher’s control and instrumental variables are very 
difficult to be found and be convincible, Bayesian Networks is an alternative tool which can be 
useful, when the former cases are absent. BN can be applied not only to observation data, which 
data are very useful for controlling for various characteristics, which in the majority of the 
natural experiments are missed. Moreover, BN can be applied to randomized experiments as 
well (Pearl, 2000, 2009; Spirtes eat al., 2000). 
Therefore, the determination that an association is causal indicates the possibility for 
intervention and thus for policy making and it can have profound consequences on labour 
productivity and firm performance through job satisfaction and employment arrangements. 
However, BN as any other statistical and econometric model, including natural and randomized 
field experiments and instrumental variables approach is the unobserved confounders which 
may not be under the control of the researcher and are not fixed. In addition, in the randomised 
experiments are fixed by the study design and thus it is usually known, while in the 
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observational data, as is the WERS used in this study, the true propensity score is not known 
and it has to be estimated from the data. Overall, the propensity score tests and results show 
that the treated and control groups share similar characteristics in this study.  
 
6 Conclusions 
 
 
 
The findings of this study suggest that there is a positive effect for a range of employment 
arrangements on job satisfaction and employee loyalty. The strongest effects have been found 
to be for teleworkers and those who have flexible working schedule. This may indicate further 
that these types of employment can allow the employees to use them as means of relief from 
stressful condition, coming mainly from commuting at work and the traffic congestion.  
Moreover, these types of working arrangements, may give to employees more autonomy and 
control of the working schedule and to allow them to adjust it on their needs, including family 
demands and obligations and leisure activities. Furthermore, future research might take place 
on how these employment arrangements improve the labour productivity and the firm 
performance, through job satisfaction, as well as, how much costs are saved in terms of office, 
equipment and other labour related costs.  For example, employees spending more time at 
home, employers can afford to lease or purchase smaller, less expensive facilities, pay less for 
energy and electricity and purchase fewer supplies. In addition, this study showed that in the 
case of the implementation of this type of employment arrangements and especially the 
employees who are involved in teleworking, are more likely to report higher levels of loyalty 
than those who do not implement them.  Overall, managing turnover intention is a challenge 
for many organizations that incur very high costs as a result of voluntary turnover and retaining 
good workers is critical to any organization, public or private and especially for valuable and 
high skilled employees, while the costs associated with the new employees recruitment is also 
high and this usually takes time. Thus, flexible employment arrangements, including 
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teleworking can be a solution to turnover intention reduction, increasing the job satisfaction and 
improving the well-being of employees and saving costs for organizations. However, most of 
these issues have not been examined here but are proposed for future research and application. 
Moreover, the type of work, such as creative or dull duties have not been explored in this study, 
but it is suggested for future application. For instance, those who are teleworkers may be more 
satisfied with their jobs if they are involved in creative duties than dull ones, while also creative 
jobs may increase the propensity to telework.  Finally, BN and DAG, as it has been discussed, 
offer an alternative way of deriving causality using observational data and surveys, with various 
policy implications and implementations to workplaces, employees, employers and to the 
society overall.  
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework of Flexible Employment Arrangements, Job Satisfaction and 
Employee Loyalty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. An example of a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) 
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Figure 3. PC algorithm pseudo-code for the estimated DAG 
Step 1:  
Start with the complete undirected graph, C~ with vertices V = X1, . . . ,Xp. Then: 
Step 2:  
Set l = −1 and C = C~ 
Step 3: 
Increase l by one. For all pairs of adjacent nodes: 
• Check for conditional independence 
• Remove edge (Xi,  Xj) if Xi ⊥⊥ Xj|rest 
Step 4: 
Repeat step 2 until l = m or until each node has fewer than l − 1 neighbours 
And let mr each ∈ max l, m denote the stopping level of the algorithm and q be the maximum number of 
neighbours 
 
In plain words the above pseuso-code of the PC algorithm works on the following simple steps.  
• For each X and Y, see if X ⊥Y; if so, remove their edge. 
• For each X and Y which are still connected, and each third variable Z1, see if X ⊥ Y|Z; if so, remove 
the edge between X and Y. 
• For each X and Y which are still connected, and each third and fourth variables 
• Z1 and Z2, see if X ⊥ Y|Z1,Z2; if so, remove their edge. 
For each X and Y which are still connected, see if X ⊥ Y| all the p − 2 other variables; if so, remove, their edge 
 
 
Figure 4.  Illustration of IV conditions 
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Figure 5. DAG for Teleworking 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum  
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
Job 
Satisfaction 
3.8134 0.8939 1 5  
Employee 
Loyalty 
3.8423 0.9264 1 5  
Panel B: Employment Arrangements 
Flexible Time 
(Yes) 
39.08 Reduce 
Hours 
(Yes) 
26.27 Increase 
Hours (Yes) 
24.74 
Flexible Time 
(No) 
60.92 Reduce 
Hours 
(No) 
73.73 Increase 
Hours (No) 
75.26 
Teleworking 
(Yes) 
15.87 Change 
shifts 
(Yes) 
21.78 Compress 
hours (Yes) 
20.42 
Teleworking 
(No) 
84.13 Change 
shifts (No) 
78.22 Compress 
hours (No) 
79.58 
 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 Job 
satisfaction 
Loyalty Flexi time Reduce 
hours 
Increase 
hours 
Teleworking Change 
shifts 
Loyalty 0.4637*** 
(0.0000) 
      
Flexi time 0.1322*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1473*** 
(0.0000) 
     
Reduce hours 0.0718*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0501*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3392*** 
(0.0000) 
    
Increase hours 0.0521*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0418*** 
(0.000) 
0.2712*** 
(0.0000) 
0.5689*** 
(0.0000) 
   
Teleworking 0.1187*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1368*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2763*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0757*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0421*** 
(0.0009) 
  
Change shifts 0.0751*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0506*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2977*** 
(0.0000) 
0.4144*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3907*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1040*** 
(0.0000) 
 
Compress hours 0.1001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0806*** 
(0.0004) 
0.3336*** 
(0.0000) 
0.4308*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3349*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2105*** 
(0.0000) 
0.4432*** 
(0.0000) 
P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3. Fixed Effects Estimates for Job Satisfaction and Flexible Working Types 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Flexible Time (Yes) 0.1383***       
 (0.0184)       
Reduce Hours (Yes)  0.0633***      
  (0.0222)      
Increase Hours (Yes)   0.0782***     
   (0.0213)     
Teleworking (Yes)    0.1335***    
    (0.0245)    
Change shifts (Yes)     0.1351***   
     (0.0208)   
Compressing Hours (Yes)      0.1220***  
      (0.0217)  
Flexible Time (Yes)       0.0983*** 
       (0.0283) 
Reduce Hours (Yes)       0.0027 
       (0.0351) 
Increase Hours (Yes)       0.0402 
       (0.0323) 
Teleworking (Yes)       0.0968*** 
       (0.0355) 
Change shifts (Yes)       0.0519* 
       (0.0267) 
Compressing Hours (Yes)       0.0498 
       (0.0355) 
Observations 8,204 7,419 7,263 8,923 8,145 7,261 6,102 
R-squared 0.2653 0.2739 0.2740 0.2675 0.2696 0.2770 0.3097 
Wave-area specific clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
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Table 4. Determinants of Employment Arrangements 
 Flexible Reduce 
Hours 
Increase 
Hours 
Teleworking Change 
Shifts 
Compress 
hours 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age (reference category 16-17)       
Age (18-19) 0.2235 -0.3277 -0.0787 -0.3913 -0.1421 -0.2508 
 (0.2969) (0.3293) (0.2857) (0.6694) (0.2637) (0.3246) 
Age (20-21) -0.1865 -0.4053 -0.0723 -0.2541 -0.1230 -0.2943 
 (0.2932) (0.3309) (0.2859) (0.6275) (0.2631) (0.3250) 
Age (22-29) -0.6584** -0.8527*** -0.6122** -0.2655 -0.7369*** -0.7591** 
 (0.2639) (0.2968) (0.2530) (0.5565) (0.2352) (0.2977) 
Age (30-39) -0.8200*** -0.7691** -0.6935*** 0.3448 -0.6911*** -0.7108** 
 (0.2667) (0.2996) (0.2560) (0.5538) (0.2390) (0.3002) 
Age (40-49) -0.8261*** -1.2338*** -0.9549*** 0.1409 -0.9007*** -1.0147*** 
 (0.2698) (0.3027) (0.2609) (0.5572) (0.2440) (0.3051) 
Age (50-59) -0.6775** -1.1738*** -1.1045*** 0.1161 -0.9124*** -0.9284*** 
 (0.2721) (0.3075) (0.2653) (0.5597) (0.2475) (0.3078) 
Age (60-64) -0.3056 -0.4735 -1.0297*** 0.2015 -0.5481* -0.4251 
 (0.3056) (0.3462) (0.3114) (0.6164) (0.2907) (0.3476) 
Age (65 and above) 0.4099 -0.1678 -0.2819 0.9058 -0.2110 -0.3500 
 (0.3983) (0.4942) (0.4190) (0.6223) (0.3982) (0.4688) 
Marital status (reference category 
single) 
      
Marital status-Married or couple 0.0739 0.2752 -0.0159 0.1444 -0.1557 0.1966 
 (0.1431) (0.1973) (0.1770) (0.2005) (0.1806) (0.1691) 
Marital status-Divorced -0.0874 -0.0841 -0.1558 0.1565 -0.1563 -0.2722** 
 (0.1126) (0.1320) (0.1270) (0.1664) (0.1218) (0.1339) 
Marital status-Widowed -0.0793 -0.1092 -0.1854** 0.1961* -0.1154 -0.1735* 
 (0.0767) (0.0890) (0.0849) (0.1126) (0.0802) (0.0886) 
Education level (reference category 
primary school) 
      
Education level- GCSE  D-E levels -0.0105 -0.0942 -0.0623 0.1014 -0.0414 -0.1810*** 
 (0.0553) (0.0665) (0.0638) (0.0816) (0.0619) (0.0655) 
Education level- GCSE  B-S levels -0.0463 -0.0298 -0.0126 -0.1461 -0.0493 0.1086 
 (0.0745) (0.0898) (0.0871) (0.1042) (0.0853) (0.0889) 
Education level- GCSE  A-AS levels 0.0233 0.2087*** 0.0294 0.3855*** 0.1566** 0.0865 
 (0.0648) (0.0784) (0.0761) (0.0822) (0.0752) (0.0776) 
Education level-First degree 0.1994*** 0.0499 -0.0072 0.5650*** 0.0036 -0.0709 
 (0.0660) (0.0827) (0.0811) (0.0819) (0.0779) (0.0807) 
Education level-Higher degree 0.1498 -0.0742 0.0310 0.5860*** 0.0562 0.1760 
 (0.1059) (0.1340) (0.1321) (0.1232) (0.1356) (0.1330) 
Dependent children aged 0-2 (Yes) 0.1110 0.5655*** -0.0037 -0.1579 -0.0987 0.1334 
 (0.0750) (0.0919) (0.0927) (0.1059) (0.0980) (0.0949) 
Dependent children any age (No) -0.3817*** 0.0168 -0.3980*** -0.1751* -0.3658*** -0.3602*** 
 (0.0675) (0.0803) (0.0769) (0.0960) (0.0729) (0.0808) 
Skills matching with the job (reference 
category much higher) 
      
Skills matching with the -bit higher 0.6947** -0.4633 0.1192 0.1251* -0.3094 -0.0917 
 (0.3152) (0.4319) (0.3611) (0.0653) (0.3562) (0.3476) 
Skills matching with the job-the same 0.7138** -0.2098 0.2713 -0.0083 -0.3007 0.0447 
 (0.2945) (0.4060) (0.3322) (0.4702) (0.3337) (0.3193) 
Skills matching with the -bit lower 0.6213** -0.2288 0.2004 -0.1767 -0.3439 -0.0504 
 (0.2952) (0.4067) (0.3322) (0.4705) (0.3340) (0.3203) 
Skills matching with the -much lower 0.4271 -0.3028 0.2518 -0.5089 -0.2773 -0.1808 
 (0.2966) (0.4078) (0.3334) (0.4767) (0.3345) (0.3213) 
Years of experience -0.0168 0.1031*** -0.0474** -0.0216 -0.0032 0.0307 
 (0.0203) (0.0254) (0.0236) (0.0286) (0.0232) (0.0250) 
Ethnicity (reference British)       
Ethnicity-Irish -0.0002 -0.0921 0.2684 0.4266 -0.1464 -0.3136 
 (0.2678) (0.3290) (0.3255) (0.3033) (0.3366) (0.3437) 
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Table 4 (cont.) Determinants of Employment Arrangements 
 Flexible Reduce 
Hours 
Increase 
Hours 
Teleworking Change 
Shifts 
Compress 
hours 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ethnicity-Other White 0.3515** -0.5615*** -0.0889 0.2143 0.0656 -0.0409 
 (0.1372) (0.1743) (0.1646) (0.1704) (0.1623) (0.1655) 
Ethnicity-White and Black Caribbean -0.1562 0.1375 -0.0105 -0.0860 0.8750 -0.2547 
 (0.4618) (0.6789) (0.4753) (0.5383) (0.5581) (0.6651) 
Ethnicity-White and Black African 0.8136 -1.3955** -0.5754 -0.2409 -0.4960 0.2602 
 (0.5610) (0.6861) (0.7171) (1.3114) (0.5672) (0.5626) 
Ethnicity-White and Asian 0.5501 0.2224 -0.7352 0.9713 0.2244 0.6664 
 (0.6074) (1.0437) (0.6368) (0.6814) (0.6615) (0.6653) 
Ethnicity-Indian 0.4917*** 0.0099 -0.0025 -0.3487 -0.0428 0.2335 
 (0.1782) (0.2250) (0.2193) (0.3237) (0.2005) (0.1955) 
Ethnicity-Pakistani 0.6464** 0.2621 0.5680 0.5176 0.5386 -0.0693 
 (0.3269) (0.3917) (0.3580) (0.6042) (0.3413) (0.3599) 
Ethnicity-Bangladeshi 0.9415 0.4558 0.6827 -0.8342 -0.4420 1.4326*** 
 (0.6477) (0.4940) (0.5642) (1.3464) (0.6627) (0.5326) 
Ethnicity-Other Asian  0.8760*** -0.9688*** -0.3672 1.2091** 0.2492 0.6857** 
 (0.3213) (0.3659) (0.3679) (0.5502) (0.2976) (0.3082) 
Ethnicity-Caribbean 0.9999*** 0.2919 1.1033*** 0.9584** 0.5331 0.6290* 
 (0.3027) (0.3923) (0.3696) (0.4579) (0.3493) (0.3301) 
Ethnicity-African 0.6044** 0.5174 0.2862 0.7235* 0.0837 1.2009*** 
 (0.3014) (0.3260) (0.3242) (0.4172) (0.3181) (0.3366) 
Ethnicity-Other black 0.3621 -0.0489 1.4128*** -0.5072 0.0351 0.6599* 
 (0.3901) (0.5066) (0.3739) (0.5777) (0.4772) (0.3955) 
Ethnicity-Chinese 0.5533 -0.6069 -0.3586 -0.9581 0.2324 0.2179 
 (0.5955) (0.6057) (0.5878) (0.7426) (0.5215) (0.5235) 
Ethnicity-Other group 0.1593 -0.7294 0.7227 1.0734 0.6259 -0.6188 
 (0.6369) (1.1641) (0.7645) (1.4685) (1.0666) (1.0695) 
Member of trade union or staff 
association (reference Yes) 
      
Member of union (No, but in the past) -0.0558 0.1388 0.1797** 0.3565*** 0.0789 0.0371 
 (0.0766) (0.0959) (0.0911) (0.1157) (0.0870) (0.0950) 
Member of union (No never) -0.0209 0.1111 0.2884*** 0.3836*** 0.0151 0.0409 
 (0.0658) (0.0810) (0.0781) (0.1020) (0.0757) (0.0811) 
Profit related payments (Yes) 0.0003 -0.1845*** -0.1616** 0.0517 -0.0538 -0.0841 
 (0.0539) (0.0668) (0.0632) (0.0777) (0.0611) (0.0662) 
Performance Payments (Yes) -0.0950* -0.0944 -0.0666 -0.2191 -0.0573 -0.0050 
 (0.0544) (0.0673) (0.0634) (0.1775) (0.0620) (0.0661) 
Total number of employees 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001** -0.00001 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00004) (0.00001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Number of establishments (reference-
one of various numbers) 
      
Number of establ. (single) 0.1537** -0.0964 0.0555 0.2222** -0.0788 0.0712 
 (0.0697) (0.0854) (0.0829) (0.0925) (0.0835) (0.0854) 
Number of establ. (sole in UK-foreign) 0.1626 -0.1311 -0.3896** 0.0663 -0.0381 -0.2894 
 (0.1356) (0.1812) (0.1891) (0.1877) (0.1715) (0.1927) 
Company Status (reference Public 
Limited Company) 
      
Company- Private Limited Company -0.0574 -0.0609 -0.0470 0.2287** -0.1673** -0.1109 
 (0.0631) (0.0776) (0.0730) (0.0952) (0.0697) (0.0763) 
Company- Limited by guarantee 0.2101 -0.1007 -0.4200** 0.5233*** -0.1776 0.0615 
 (0.1372) (0.1725) (0.1726) (0.1883) (0.1763) (0.1737) 
Company- Partnership -0.1181 0.1989 0.2163 0.2490 -0.1374 -0.0932 
 (0.1320) (0.1558) (0.1487) (0.1868) (0.1502) (0.1606) 
Company-Trust/charity 0.2466** 0.1399 -0.0394 0.5559*** 0.1661 0.2762** 
 (0.1103) (0.1276) (0.1278) (0.1566) (0.1317) (0.1283) 
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Table 4 (cont.) Determinants of Employment Arrangements 
 Flexible Reduce 
Hours 
Increase 
Hours 
Teleworking Change 
Shifts 
Compress 
hours 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Company-Royal charter 0.3455* 0.2652 -0.0582 0.6379*** -0.4398** -0.4579** 
 (0.1781) (0.2208) (0.2324) (0.2375) (0.2133) (0.2300) 
Company- Co-operative 0.0786 -0.0661 0.2305 -0.0713 -0.4020** 0.0060 
 (0.1724) (0.2129) (0.2020) (0.2844) (0.1959) (0.2125) 
Government-owned limited 0.7723*** 0.3939* -0.0853 -0.1100 -0.1895 0.5781*** 
 (0.1767) (0.2142) (0.2115) (0.2618) (0.2171) (0.2157) 
Formal policy equal opportunities (No) -0.0366* 0.1741 0.1254 0.0638 0.0145 0.0983 
 (0.0183) (0.1244) (0.1159) (0.1433) (0.1125) (0.1222) 
Supervise other employees (No) -0.0108 0.1718** -0.0305 -0.3860*** 0.0278 0.1890*** 
 (0.0566) (0.0694) (0.0681) (0.0807) (0.0654) (0.0712) 
Quality of relations between managers 
and employees (reference  
      
Number of weekly hours worked 0.0013 -0.0206*** 0.0018 -0.0134* -0.0153*** 0.0101** 
 (0.0041) (0.0052) (0.0050) (0.0076) (0.0054) (0.0047) 
Wage (reference £141-£180 per week       
Wage - £181-£220 per week 0.4201 0.6359* 0.6581** -0.6062 0.5450* 0.4456 
 (0.2833) (0.3649) (0.3243) (0.4718) (0.3281) (0.3324) 
Wage - £221-£260 per week   0.2948 0.6757* 0.5426* -0.6291 0.2158 0.3289 
 (0.2772) (0.3526) (0.3173) (0.4631) (0.3176) (0.3272) 
Wage -£261-£310 per week   0.1532 0.7039** 0.4521 -0.4291 -0.0614 0.2966 
 (0.2646) (0.3405) (0.3087) (0.4122) (0.3084) (0.3149) 
Wage - £431-£540 per week 0.0993 -0.2102 -0.4058 -0.0638 -0.4230 -0.2214 
 (0.2560) (0.3327) (0.3015) (0.3801) (0.2977) (0.3092) 
Wage -  £681-£870 per week -0.0547 -0.1739 -0.5362* 1.2575*** -0.6215* -0.3124 
 (0.2680) (0.3498) (0.3215) (0.3846) (0.3177) (0.3292) 
Wage -  £871 or more per week 0.0520 -0.2159 -0.5475* 1.8179*** -0.6946** -0.2581 
 
Market Area (reference-Local) 
(0.2723) (0.3562) (0.3251) (0.3911) (0.3271) (0.3345) 
Market Area-Regional -0.2359*** -0.2701*** -0.1706* 0.3665*** -0.4192*** -0.3914*** 
 (0.0850) (0.1015) (0.0956) (0.1246) (0.0975) (0.1035) 
Market Area-National -0.3443*** -0.1401* -0.0518 0.3362*** -0.1776** -0.2693*** 
 (0.0709) (0.0845) (0.0816) (0.1045) (0.0805) (0.0840) 
Market Area-International -0.2433*** -0.3072*** -0.2540** 0.1262 -0.2386** -0.2713** 
 (0.0895) (0.1085) (0.1054) (0.1316) (0.1014) (0.1083) 
International competition (reference-
Yes a lot) 
      
International competition-A little -0.1323 0.0210 0.0218 0.0282 -0.1138 0.1136 
 (0.0852) (0.1100) (0.1035) (0.1187) (0.0973) (0.1066) 
International competition-No 0.0228 0.1637* 0.0322 0.0860 0.0632 0.1451 
 (0.0758) (0.0976) (0.0922) (0.1111) (0.0872) (0.0969) 
Observations 7,737 6,726 6,708 7,269 7,555 6,695 
LR chi-square 982.73 
[0.000] 
1,745.60 
[0.000] 
1,462.63 
[0.000] 
1,530.09 
[0.000] 
1,469.27 
[0.000] 
736.23 
[0.000] 
Wave-area specific clustered standard errors in parentheses, p-values within brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Propensity Score Matching and Fixed Effects for Job Satisfaction 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Flexible Time 0.1333***      
 (0.0188)      
Reduce hours  0.0664***     
  (0.0227)     
Increase hours   0.0803***    
   (0.0219)    
Teleworking    0.1395***   
    (0.0251)   
Change Shifts     0.1370***  
     (0.0213)  
Compress hours      0.1151*** 
      (0.0223) 
Age (reference category 16-17)       
Age (18-19) -0.2099* -0.2165** -0.2362** -0.2820*** -0.2887*** -0.2353* 
 (0.1139) (0.1063) (0.0997) (0.1057) (0.1011) (0.1238) 
Age (20-21) -0.1112 -0.1200 -0.1035 -0.1983* -0.2071** -0.1200 
 (0.1107) (0.1055) (0.0989) (0.1044) (0.0988) (0.1207) 
Age (22-29)  0.0314 0.0001 0.0176 -0.0429 -0.0349 -0.0216 
 (0.0971) (0.0944) (0.0864) (0.0904) (0.0874) (0.1075) 
Age (30-39) 0.0916 0.0665 0.0620 -0.0004 0.0213 0.0243 
 (0.0981) (0.0959) (0.0881) (0.0914) (0.0888) (0.1089) 
Age (40-49) 0.0874 0.0555 0.0523 -0.0099 0.0135 0.0248 
 (0.0995) (0.0973) (0.0896) (0.0928) (0.0899) (0.1101) 
Age (50-59) 0.1220 0.0993 0.0819 0.0240 0.0356 0.0393 
 (0.1002) (0.0984) (0.0907) (0.0938) (0.0910) (0.1109) 
Age (60-64) 0.3745*** 0.3491*** 0.3395*** 0.2662*** 0.2953*** 0.2503** 
 (0.1077) (0.1075) (0.1007) (0.1024) (0.0995) (0.1182) 
Age (65 and above) 0.3011** 0.2720** 0.2402* 0.1634 0.1467 0.2141 
 (0.1274) (0.1264) (0.1261) (0.1212) (0.1236) (0.1401) 
Marital status (reference category single)       
Marital status-Married or couple 0.0879* 0.1073** 0.0900* 0.0918* 0.0992** 0.0923* 
 (0.0484) (0.0501) (0.0509) (0.0490) (0.0486) (0.0501) 
Marital status-Divorced 0.1338*** 0.0961** 0.0952** 0.0959** 0.0976** 0.1221*** 
 (0.0411) (0.0437) (0.0439) (0.0427) (0.0418) (0.0437) 
Marital status-Widowed 0.0547* 0.0339 0.0372 0.0447 0.0534* 0.0699** 
 (0.0294) (0.0314) (0.0318) (0.0300) (0.0295) (0.0311) 
Education level (reference primary school)       
Education level- GCSE  D-E levels -0.0263 -0.0264 -0.0312 -0.0431** -0.0354* -0.0267 
 (0.0206) (0.0216) (0.0217) (0.0208) (0.0204) (0.0219) 
Education level- GCSE  B-S levels -0.0619** -0.0242 -0.0460 -0.0587** -0.0411 -0.0529* 
 (0.0280) (0.0298) (0.0305) (0.0289) (0.0288) (0.0307) 
Education level- GCSE  A-AS levels -0.0300 -0.0523** -0.0252 -0.0559** -0.0371 -0.0378 
 (0.0243) (0.0259) (0.0261) (0.0244) (0.0249) (0.0263) 
Education level-First degree -0.0570** -0.0323 -0.0394 -0.0556** -0.0273 -0.0216 
 (0.0253) (0.0272) (0.0276) (0.0258) (0.0259) (0.0272) 
Education level-Higher degree 0.0541 0.0300 0.0672 0.0334 0.0098 0.0541 
 (0.0402) (0.0437) (0.0439) (0.0401) (0.0424) (0.0442) 
Dependent children aged 0-2 (Yes) -0.0116 -0.0529* -0.0102 -0.0139 -0.0321 -0.0312 
 (0.0268) (0.0279) (0.0284) (0.0277) (0.0279) (0.0290) 
Dependent children any age (No) 0.0067 -0.0076 0.0099 0.0002 0.0223 0.0245 
 (0.0257) (0.0273) (0.0277) (0.0259) (0.0258) (0.0270) 
Skills matching with the job (much higher)       
Skills matching with the -bit higher 0.1955 0.2652 0.2051 0.1463 0.3105* 0.2508 
 (0.1465) (0.1753) (0.1734) (0.1524) (0.1610) (0.1659) 
Skills matching with the job-the same 0.3987*** 0.3982** 0.3929** 0.3714** 0.4613*** 0.4565*** 
 (0.1388) (0.1683) (0.1656) (0.1448) (0.1538) (0.1588) 
Skills matching with the -bit lower  0.3520** 0.3207* 0.3496** 0.3244** 0.4242*** 0.3996** 
 (0.1390) (0.1687) (0.1657) (0.1448) (0.1541) (0.1589) 
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Table 5 (cont.) Propensity Score Matching and Fixed Effects for Job Satisfaction 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Skills matching with the -much lower 0.1469 0.1508 0.1408 0.1035 0.2092 0.1809 
 (0.1398) (0.1694) (0.1663) (0.1456) (0.1547) (0.1597) 
Quality of relations (reference-very poor)       
Quality of relations-Poor 0.3882*** 0.4092*** 0.4098*** 0.4261*** 0.4077*** 0.4131*** 
 (0.0706) (0.0743) (0.0756) (0.0763) (0.0711) (0.0726) 
Quality of relations-Neither good nor bad 0.6453*** 0.7146*** 0.7234*** 0.7010*** 0.7083*** 0.7138*** 
 (0.0662) (0.0696) (0.0707) (0.0718) (0.0670) (0.0682) 
Quality of relations-Good  0.9780*** 1.0448*** 1.0627*** 1.0281*** 1.0206*** 1.0255*** 
 (0.0653) (0.0682) (0.0695) (0.0707) (0.0659) (0.0670) 
Quality of relations-Very Good 1.3275*** 1.4224*** 1.4441*** 1.3853*** 1.3813*** 1.4010*** 
 (0.0672) (0.0702) (0.0714) (0.0724) (0.0677) (0.0689) 
Years of experience in this workplace 0.0080 0.0056 0.0114 0.0040 0.0106 0.0079 
 (0.0076) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0081) 
Ethnicity (reference British)       
Ethnicity-Irish -0.1003 -0.0613 -0.1017 -0.1287 -0.0595 -0.0854 
 (0.1045) (0.1169) (0.1231) (0.1007) (0.1090) (0.1113) 
Ethnicity-Other White -0.1802*** -0.1597*** -0.1398** -0.1587*** -0.1612*** -0.1728*** 
 (0.0532) (0.0552) (0.0566) (0.0518) (0.0543) (0.0571) 
Ethnicity-White and Black Caribbean -0.3126 -0.2813 -0.2968 -0.2766 -0.3678* -0.5628** 
 (0.2243) (0.2541) (0.2137) (0.2038) (0.1996) (0.2519) 
Ethnicity-White and Black African 0.0204 -0.0154 0.0206 -0.0094 -0.0269 0.0314 
 (0.1685) (0.1781) (0.1520) (0.1685) (0.1790) (0.1411) 
Ethnicity-White and Asian -0.1201 0.1029 -0.0806 -0.3148 -0.1804 -0.3819 
 (0.3301) (0.4011) (0.3671) (0.3861) (0.3294) (0.3602) 
Ethnicity-Indian -0.0069 0.0310 0.0116 -0.0306 -0.0330 0.0034 
 (0.0640) (0.0648) (0.0708) (0.0654) (0.0662) (0.0640) 
Ethnicity-Pakistani 0.1507 0.1689 0.1621 0.1570 0.1735 0.0984 
 (0.1186) (0.1237) (0.1296) (0.1371) (0.1420) (0.1284) 
Ethnicity-Bangladeshi -0.4250* -0.1598 -0.2957 -0.2560 -0.3646 -0.4823** 
 (0.2198) (0.2038) (0.2144) (0.2685) (0.2222) (0.2086) 
Ethnicity-Other Asian  0.0065 -0.0001 0.0352 -0.0632 0.0652 -0.0632 
 (0.1108) (0.1211) (0.1258) (0.1049) (0.1102) (0.1253) 
Ethnicity-Caribbean -0.3071** -0.3310*** -0.2416** -0.3157*** -0.3026** -0.2806** 
 (0.1208) (0.1172) (0.1076) (0.1057) (0.1177) (0.1173) 
Ethnicity-African -0.1534 -0.0502 -0.0763 -0.1481 -0.1165 -0.1173 
 (0.1048) (0.1148) (0.1035) (0.1089) (0.1009) (0.1216) 
Ethnicity-Other black -0.3553** -0.3201** -0.3903** -0.4665*** -0.3583** -0.3655** 
 (0.1623) (0.1620) (0.1641) (0.1500) (0.1575) (0.1637) 
Ethnicity-Chinese -0.0432 -0.1741 -0.2257 -0.0075 -0.0237 -0.1378 
 (0.1545) (0.1640) (0.1769) (0.1450) (0.1216) (0.1711) 
Ethnicity-Other group 0.2260 0.2263 0.1778 0.0751 0.4041** 0.2687 
 (0.2353) (0.2336) (0.2310) (0.2386) (0.1632) (0.2305) 
Member of trade union (reference Yes)       
Member of union (No, but in the past) 0.0517* 0.0353 0.0314 0.0324 0.0163 0.0457 
 (0.0287) (0.0310) (0.0309) (0.0299) (0.0290) (0.0309) 
Member of union (No never) 0.0763*** 0.0808*** 0.0565** 0.0962*** 0.0543** 0.0702*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0257) (0.0253) (0.0272) 
Profit related payments (Yes) 0.0252 0.0197 0.0136 0.0149 0.0276 0.0317 
 (0.0199) (0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0201) (0.0200) (0.0215) 
Proportion of appraisal (reference 100%)       
Proportion - (80-99%) -0.0056 -0.0343 -0.0023 -0.0068 -0.0008 -0.0448 
 (0.0442) (0.0469) (0.0473) (0.0448) (0.0436) (0.0478) 
Proportion - (60-79%) 0.0383 0.0604 0.0461 0.0714 0.0744 0.0996* 
 (0.0477) (0.0508) (0.0510) (0.0512) (0.0478) (0.0517) 
Proportion - (40-59%) 0.0066 -0.0683 0.0303 0.0531 -0.0188 0.0100 
 (0.0712) (0.0818) (0.0784) (0.0718) (0.0751) (0.0795) 
Proportion - (20-39%) 0.0010 0.0305 0.0348 0.0066 0.0210 0.0179 
 (0.0459) (0.0478) (0.0477) (0.0485) (0.0455) (0.0488) 
44 
 
Table 5 (cont.) Propensity Score Matching and Fixed Effects for Job Satisfaction 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Proportion - (1-19%) 0.0275 0.0121 0.0529 0.0339 0.0228 0.0303 
 (0.0488) (0.0518) (0.0511) (0.0516) (0.0483) (0.0509) 
Number of weekly hours worked 0.0018 0.0020 0.0003 0.0022 0.0013 0.0007 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Wage (reference £141-£180 per week       
Wage - £181-£220 per week 0.1648* 0.2170** 0.2164* 0.1117 0.0981 0.1400 
 (0.0927) (0.1084) (0.1127) (0.1049) (0.1061) (0.1159) 
Wage - £221-£260 per week   0.1673* 0.2603** 0.2665** 0.2005** 0.1909* 0.2347** 
 (0.0894) (0.1043) (0.1100) (0.1014) (0.1039) (0.1126) 
Wage - £261-£310 per week   0.1174 0.1752* 0.2014* 0.1310 0.1019 0.1248 
 (0.0890) (0.1051) (0.1100) (0.1013) (0.1036) (0.1127) 
Wage - £431-£540 per week 0.1538* 0.1909* 0.2238** 0.1398 0.1344 0.1840* 
 (0.0870) (0.1025) (0.1073) (0.0990) (0.1007) (0.1094) 
Wage -  £681-£870 per week 0.1831** 0.2008* 0.2758** 0.1668 0.1672 0.1699 
 (0.0903) (0.1055) (0.1112) (0.1023) (0.1048) (0.1117) 
Wage -  £871 or more per week 0.3141*** 0.3576*** 0.4381*** 0.2953*** 0.3436*** 0.3824*** 
 (0.0904) (0.1062) (0.1110) (0.1024) (0.1051) (0.1122) 
Performance related payments (Yes) 0.0399** 0.0388* 0.0410* 0.0437** 0.0314 0.0306 
 (0.0199) (0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0202) (0.0200) (0.0215) 
Number of establishments (reference many)       
Number of establ. (single) 0.0050 0.0182 0.0221 0.0125 0.0155 0.0101 
 (0.0246) (0.0259) (0.0262) (0.0255) (0.0250) (0.0264) 
Number of establ. (sole in UK-foreign) -0.0787 -0.0962* -0.0945* -0.1266** -0.0601 -0.0890 
 (0.0492) (0.0550) (0.0574) (0.0538) (0.0520) (0.0564) 
Company Status (reference Public)       
Company- Private Limited Company 0.0089 -0.0115 -0.0026 -0.0059 0.0013 -0.0015 
 (0.0235) (0.0250) (0.0254) (0.0234) (0.0238) (0.0252) 
Company- Limited by guarantee 0.1008** 0.0756 0.0900 0.0960* 0.0745 0.0840 
 (0.0501) (0.0551) (0.0565) (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0540) 
Company- Partnership 0.0224 -0.0266 -0.0073 -0.0014 0.0245 0.0133 
 (0.0439) (0.0480) (0.0471) (0.0453) (0.0454) (0.0487) 
Company-Trust/charity 0.0443 0.0217 0.0658* -0.0006 0.0083 0.0140 
 (0.0386) (0.0406) (0.0397) (0.0400) (0.0391) (0.0420) 
Company-Royal charter 0.0857 0.1635** 0.0898 0.1067* 0.0657 0.1077 
 (0.0655) (0.0737) (0.0740) (0.0645) (0.0682) (0.0738) 
Company- Co-operative -0.0130 0.0114 0.0463 -0.0407 -0.0654 0.0092 
 (0.0677) (0.0751) (0.0724) (0.0693) (0.0719) (0.0742) 
Government-owned limited -0.0757 -0.0127 0.0090 -0.0826 -0.0659 -0.0289 
 (0.0693) (0.0764) (0.0751) (0.0711) (0.0678) (0.0742) 
Formal policy equal opportunities (No) -0.0295 -0.0203 -0.0376 -0.0185 -0.0196 -0.0143 
 (0.0371) (0.0392) (0.0396) (0.0389) (0.0369) (0.0398) 
Supervise other employees (No) -0.1048*** -0.1198*** -0.1145*** -0.0921*** -0.1014*** -0.1152*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0213) (0.0212) (0.0224) 
Market Area (reference-Local)       
Market Area-Regional 0.0610** 0.0813** 0.0615* 0.0463 0.0682** 0.0465 
 (0.0308) (0.0323) (0.0324) (0.0315) (0.0311) (0.0336) 
Market Area-National 0.0216 0.0112 0.0049 -0.0080 0.0013 -0.0043 
 (0.0260) (0.0273) (0.0276) (0.0259) (0.0261) (0.0280) 
Market Area-International 0.0426 0.0423 0.0685* 0.0346 0.0425 0.0081 
 (0.0325) (0.0351) (0.0350) (0.0326) (0.0329) (0.0347) 
International comp. (reference-Yes a lot)       
International competition-A little -0.0152 -0.0232 -0.0265 -0.0153 -0.0013 -0.0200 
 (0.0317) (0.0335) (0.0347) (0.0320) (0.0322) (0.0342) 
International competition-No -0.0273 -0.0347 -0.0257 -0.0301 -0.0225 -0.0185 
 (0.0288) (0.0310) (0.0316) (0.0288) (0.0293) (0.0310) 
Observations 7,737 6,726 6,708 7,269 7,555 6,695 
R-squared 0.2634 0.2715 0.2738 0.2594 0.2668 0.2747 
Wave-area specific clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Propensity Score Matching Test 
Variables PS test Variables PS test Variables PS test 
Sex -0.25  
(0.799) 
Ethnicity -1.08  
(0.278) 
Number of weekly hours worked -0.31  
(0.759) 
Age 1.27  
(0.203) 
Member of trade 
union 
-0.96  
(0.338) 
Firm type 1.50  
(0.134) 
Marital Status -0.69  
(0.489) 
Profit-related 
payments 
0.67  
(0.500) 
Formal polies for equal opportunities 1.85*  
(0.064) 
Education level 0.44  
(0.657) 
Proportion of non-
managerial staff 
evaluated 
-0.40  
(0.686) 
Supervise others -0.76  
(0.446) 
Dependent children 
0-2 years old 
1.21  
(0.226) 
Performance related 
payment 
1.62  
(0.105) 
Market area -1.61  
(0.156) 
No dependent 
children 
0.10  
(0.922) 
Total employment -1.52  
(0.139) 
competition 0.51  
(0.611) 
Skills matching 
with the job 
-0.64  
(0.522) 
Number of 
establishments 
-0.04  
(0.966) 
Standard occupation classification 0.68  
(0.494) 
Quality of relations 
between managers 
and employees 
-0.71  
(0.478) 
Years working in the 
current workplace 
0.15  
(0.880) 
Firm Location-Region 0.08  
(0.939) 
Wage -0.99  
(0.323) 
    
P-values in parentheses, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 7. Propensity Score Matching and Fixed Effects for Job Satisfaction Factor Index and 
Employee Loyalty 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: DV Job Satisfaction 
Flexible time 0.2150***      
 (0.0177)      
Reduce hours  0.1131***     
  (0.0217)     
Increase hours   0.1502***    
   (0.0206)    
Teleworking    0.2166***   
    (0.0241)   
Change shifts     0.2082***  
     (0.0201)  
Compress hours      0.1663*** 
      (0.0217) 
Observations 7,459 6,481 6,473 7,022 7,284 6,427 
R-squared 0.2197 0.2139 0.2219 0.2107 0.2139 0.2284 
Panel B: DV Employee Loyalty 
Flexible time 0.1294***      
 (0.0186)      
Reduce hours  0.0365     
  (0.0222)     
Increase hours   0.0701***    
   (0.0221)    
Teleworking    0.1506***   
    (0.0251)   
Change shifts     0.0951***  
     (0.0212)  
Compress hours      0.0689*** 
      (0.0225) 
Observations 7,732 6,727 6,719 7,263 7,560 6,691 
R-squared 0.2158 0.2103 0.2125 0.2065 0.2104 0.2142 
Wave-area specific clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01 
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Table 8. Job Satisfaction Fixed Effects Estimates for total sample and movers 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A- Total Sample 
Flexible time 0.1272***      
 (0.0176)      
Reduce hours  0.0577***     
  (0.0209)     
Increase hours   0.0768***    
   (0.0204)    
Teleworking    0.1264***   
    (0.0236)   
Change shifts     0.1355***  
     (0.0197)  
Compress hours      0.0985*** 
      (0.0205) 
Observations 9,051 7,884 7,813 8,593 8,792 7,811 
R-squared 0.2661 0.2752 0.2768 0.2616 0.2705 0.2792 
Panel B: Movers Sample 
Flexible time 0.0638      
 (0.0492)      
Reduce hours  0.0672     
  (0.0533)     
Increase hours   0.0272    
   (0.0557)    
Teleworking    0.1363**   
    (0.0644)   
Change shifts     0.0888*  
     (0.0525)  
Compress hours      0.0284 
      (0.0527) 
Observations 1,314 1,158 1,105 1,324 1,237 1,116 
R-squared 0.3855 0.4150 0.3975 0.3855 0.4074 0.4304 
Wave-area specific clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
Table 9. 3SLS Estimates for Job Satisfaction and Employee Loyalty  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: DV Job Satisfaction 
Flexible time 0.0489***      
 (0.0175)      
Reduce hours  0.0551***     
  (0.0205)     
Increase hours   0.0492**    
   (0.0200)    
Teleworking    0.0580**   
    (0.0239)   
Change shifts     0.0915***  
     (0.0193)  
Compress hours      0.0560*** 
      (0.0203) 
Employee loyalty (reference 
category strongly disagree) 
      
Employee loyalty -disagree  0.6183*** 0.6674*** 0.6288*** 0.5935*** 0.6017*** 0.5646*** 
 (0.0573) (0.0595) (0.0604) (0.0588) (0.0562) (0.0599) 
Employee loyalty -neither 
agree nor disagree 
1.2145*** 
(0.0539) 
1.2547*** 
(0.0559) 
1.2474*** 
(0.0569) 
1.2069*** 
(0.0550) 
1.2087*** 
(0.0527) 
1.1513*** 
(0.0566) 
Employee loyalty -agree 1.8065*** 
(0.0531) 
1.8464*** 
(0.0550) 
1.8577*** 
(0.0559) 
1.7980*** 
(0.0542) 
1.7897*** 
(0.0519) 
1.7277*** 
(0.0557) 
Employee loyalty –strongly 
agree 
2.3797*** 
(0.0556) 
2.4238*** 
(0.0576) 
2.4204*** 
(0.0585) 
2.3763*** 
(0.0568) 
2.3508*** 
(0.0544) 
2.2909*** 
(0.0584) 
Observations 7,732 6,726 6,708 7,263 7,555 6,691 
R-squared 0.2507 0.2643 0.2655 0.2547 0.2570 0.2607 
Panel B: DV Employee Loyalty  
Flexible time 0.0515***      
 (0.0174)      
Reduce hours  0.0182     
  (0.0206)     
Increase hours   0.0469**    
   (0.0199)    
Teleworking    0.0714***   
    (0.0236)   
Change shifts     0.0056  
     (0.0194)  
Compress hours      0.0511** 
      (0.0234) 
Job satisfaction (reference 
category-very dissatisfied) 
      
       
Job satisfaction-dissatisfied 0.6174*** 0.5918*** 0.5584*** 0.6164*** 0.6336*** 0.5242*** 
 (0.0547) (0.0580) (0.0573) (0.0562) (0.0560) (0.0585) 
Job satisfaction-neither 
dissatisfied nor satisfied 
1.0858*** 
(0.0502) 
1.0874*** 
(0.0532) 
1.0881*** 
(0.0526) 
1.0971*** 
(0.0519) 
1.1337*** 
(0.0519) 
1.0131*** 
(0.0541) 
Job satisfaction- satisfied 1.7171*** 
(0.0489) 
1.7441*** 
(0.0519) 
1.7261*** 
(0.0512) 
1.7319*** 
(0.0506) 
1.7683*** 
(0.0506) 
1.6471*** 
(0.0529) 
Job satisfaction- very 
satisfied 
2.3177*** 
(0.0524) 
2.3361*** 
(0.0555) 
2.3265*** 
(0.0548) 
2.3240*** 
(0.0541) 
2.3623*** 
(0.0541) 
2.2411*** 
(0.0566) 
Observations 7,732 6,726 6,708 7,263 7,555 6,691 
R-squared 0.3117 0.3142 0.3124 0.3119 0.3083 0.3088 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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Table 10. BN and DAG Estimates for Job Satisfaction, Employee Loyalty and Employee 
Arrangements 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: DV Job Satisfaction 
Flexible time 0.1298***      
 (0.0211)      
Reduce hours  0.0693***     
  (0.0232)     
Increase hours   0.0582**    
   (0.0231)    
Teleworking    0.1268***   
    (0.0300)   
Change shifts     0.1237***  
     (0.0217)  
Compress hours      0.1079*** 
      (0.0248) 
Observations 7,732 6,726 6,708 7,263 7,555 6,691 
Panel B: DV Employee Loyalty  
Flexible time 0.0885***      
 (0.0200)      
Reduce hours  0.0089     
  (0.0220)     
Increase hours   0.0389*    
   (0.0207)    
Teleworking    0.0803***   
    (0.0268)   
Change shifts     0.0506*  
     (0.0256)  
Compress hours      0.0482** 
      (0.0221) 
Job satisfaction (reference 
category-very dissatisfied) 
      
       
Job satisfaction-dissatisfied 0.3952*** 0.3505*** 0.3424*** 0.3623*** 0.4105*** 0.2924*** 
 (0.0642) (0.0684) (0.0683) (0.0603) (0.0656) (0.0674) 
Job satisfaction-neither 
dissatisfied nor satisfied 
0.5696*** 
(0.0590) 
0.5574*** 
(0.0692) 
0.6066*** 
(0.0629) 
0.5168*** 
(0.0528) 
0.6236*** 
(0.0609) 
0.4939*** 
(0.0624) 
Job satisfaction- satisfied 0.9794*** 
(0.0572) 
0.9803*** 
(0.0612) 
1.0042*** 
(0.0610) 
0.9754 *** 
(0.0517) 
1.0314*** 
(0.0591) 
0.9120*** 
(0.0607) 
Job satisfaction- very 
satisfied 
1.3645*** 
(0.0618) 
1.3497*** 
(0.0657) 
1.3723*** 
(0.0656) 
1.3507** 
(0.0609) 
1.3917*** 
(0.0635) 
1.2775*** 
(0.0653) 
Observations 7,732 6,726 6,708 7,263 7,555 6,691 
Wave-area specific clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
